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Introduction 
Luxury cars are a symbol of wealth, success and prestige and are a commodity of a 
sophisticated monopolistically competitive market around the world. Considering luxury 
cars to be representative of superior goods, you would expect sales to be decreasing during 
an economic downturn. However, while sales of luxury cars in Europe and the US declined 
during the GFC, sales within Australia increased substantially.    
  This paper presents a closer inspection of this market in Australia and particularly focuses 
on how the government has applied the Luxury Car Tax (LCT). It looks at the impact of the 
LCT on the Australian luxury car market from an economic perspective, and attempts to 
explain the political rationale for maintaining such a tax. 
 
About the Luxury Car Tax (LCT) 
The LCT was first introduced in Australia in 2000, at the same time that the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) replaced the wholesale sales tax. Currently the Australian Taxation 
Office (ATO) defines a “luxury” car as any vehicle which carries less than two tonnes, less 
than nine passengers and is a passenger car, station wagon or four-wheel drive vehicle with 
a GST-inclusive price (LCT value) above the LCT threshold of $57,466 or $75,375 for cars 
with a fuel economy of less than 7 litres per 100km. According to the ATO’s website the tax 
is calculated based on the LCT value of the car less the LCT threshold less the amount of GST 
above the threshold less the LCT rate or equivalently: 
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[(Retail value including GST) – (LCT threshold value)] x (10 / 11) x (33 / 100) 
   
The initial LCT rate was set at 25%, however, in July 2008, this rate was increased to 33% by 
the Rudd Government. At the time, Treasurer Swann advised that the ‘Government believes 
that Australians who can afford luxury vehicles have the capacity to contribute to revenue at a 
higher rate than other car buyers.’ (Increasing the Luxury car Tax, 2008). He also went on to 
forecast that the increased LCT rate would generate an additional $555mn over 4 years 
(2008). Table 1 demonstrates the returns from the LCT over the past four periods. In other 
words, the tax incidence would fall upon the wealthy by reducing their collective surplus 
by such amounts.   
 
Table 1: Actual luxury car tax collections (ATO Statistics) 
2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10
$321M $370M $447M $376M $482m 
 
 
However, the LCT can be seen as a directly-unproductive profit-seeking activity (DUP). 
Bhagwati (1996) describes two groups within the DUP theory:  
1. Downstream activities where lobbying income is derived from import quotas or 
tariff revenues (also known as rent seeking or revenue-seeking). 
2. Upstream activities where lobbying income is derived from protectionism (or lack 
thereof) and affects the profits earned.  
  The LCT falls into the downstream category and can be seen as an exacerbating the 
deadweight cost in the market.  
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Graph 1: Supply/demand curve showing dead weight loss due to tax. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economic Significance of the LCT 
If we begin with the premise of neoclassical economics that a policy of unhindered free 
trade maximizes welfare and enables markets to achieve efficiency in equilibrium we can 
then understand the Australian Government’s decision on the LCT as a political-economic 
two-level game. On one level by lowering the import tax from 10% to 5%, the government 
signalled to the international markets a positive step towards a freer trade policy. However, 
on the second level, the LCT is applied to a minority which is unlikely to be able organise a 
coalition with enough effectiveness to oppose the tax successfully and thereby panders to 
the majority electorate. Furthermore, the LCT:  
Price 
Quantity 
S1 
D1 
Q* 
P* 
S + tax 
Pc 
Q1 
Pp 
 The addition of the sales tax causes a 
shift in the supply curve (S1 to S + tax) 
 This causes an increase in the price for 
consumers from P* to Pc 
 This then reduces the quantity 
demanded from Q* to Q1 
 This also results in the price received by 
the car producers to fall to Pp.

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 would not be likely to draw retaliation from trading partners as it is applied to both 
the foreign and the domestic luxury car market; 
 is a domestic policy that drives a wedge between market prices and social costs and 
 is not an explicit  trade barrier such as a duty or a quota would be 
  The first law of demand tells us that there is an inverse relationship between the price of a 
good and its demand, all things being equal (Graph 1). The LCT creates a dead weight loss 
due to inefficient underproduction (the area shaded on graph 1) where the distribution of 
the burden of the tax is increased for the consumer and decreased for the producer.  
  Government intervention in the luxury car market, via application of the LCT and 
associated threshold, also creates distortion in consumer choice in a number of ways. First, 
consumers that find themselves making choices at the threshold may opt for buying 
cheaper cars to avoid paying the LCT. This leads to a welfare loss in terms of consumer 
surplus.  Second, the preferences of luxury car consumers may shift from standard 
specification models to higher specification ones in line with the third law of demand - 
when the price of two substitute goods increase by the same amount per unit including 
LCT, there will be a shift in demand towards the higher grade goods. Empirically, retailers 
do offer higher specification models in Australia relative to the rest of the world. This 
offsets the effect of LCT on price countering the impact of the tax negatively impacting 
luxury car sales.  
  Both of these effects will reduce producer surplus. Also, the higher 'fuel efficient' 
threshold may incentivise the purchasing of 'fuel efficient' cars. However, the definition of 
'fuel efficient' vehicles via a simple fuel consumption limit is questionable in terms of its 
effectiveness from an environmental viewpoint and may well distort the incentives on 
pursuing other forms of innovations. Furthermore, the car accessories market is distorted 
in favour of 'after market' suppliers in the case of luxury cars, because LCT is applied to 
accessories when included at the time of car purchase, whereas it does not apply when 
purchased after the vehicle is bought.  
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Political Economy  
Under Bhagwati’s (1996) clearinghouse government model of introducing the government in 
economic constructs, economic agents such as lobby groups compete with each other to 
win more favourable policy outcomes. Table 2 shows possible lobbies in relation to this tax 
to understand the sources of discrepancy between economic theory and reality. 
 
Table 2: Supporting and Opposing lobbies for the LCT 
Supporting Lobbies Opposing lobbies 
Competitors Luxury Car Manufactures and Consumers 
 Manufacturers of non-luxury cars  
 Alternative luxury goods vendors.  
 Brand loyal customers 
 Regional 4WD consumers are subject to this tax 
even though these cars are a necessity and not a 
luxury item.  (FCAI, 2008) 
 
Lower-Income Groups Environmental Protectionists 
 People who cannot afford luxury cars – a larger 
coalition than that of those who can afford a 
luxury car.  
 Based on Ability-to –Pay Principle: where the 
burden shifts towards the wealthy rather than 
the poor 
 Luxury cars have advantages in safety features as 
well as lower emissions and fuel-efficient 
technologies (FCAI 2008)  
Environmental Protectionists Free Trade Advocates 
 The LCT incentivises fuel efficient ‘green’ cars 
through a higher threshold.   
 
 LCT can be construed as a non-tariff barrier 
 
 
The application of the LCT follows the Grossman-Helpmann (1994) model for endogenous 
protection and explains the curious relationship between increased taxes and increasing 
demand of high value vehicles. This model relates to a Ramsey tax structure that advocates 
minimizing the deadweight loss of taxation by taxing goods with the most inelastic 
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demand. It predicts that, for unorganized industries, the relationship between the number 
of imports and the level of trade protection is inverse as the industry cannot sustain trade 
protection and will have to compete with imports.  
  By extending the Grossman-Helpman model and assuming that the government considers 
tariff revenues as a separate policy priority in order to support budgetary performance and 
deliver the demands of a two-level game, the government is mostly concerned with budget 
income and tariff revenues followed by public welfare, with special interest lobbies being 
the lowest ranked. As a result the following predictions of the model are relevant: 
By way of example, The Australian Financial Review (13th June 2011) recently reported a 178% 
increase in Australian Rolls Royce sales for the year. Despite the increased level of taxation 
and implied deadweight loss, Ramsay’s pricing theory seems to hold. 
 
LCT – Winners and losers  
People engaged in ordinary economic activity are driven by self-interest. In the case of the 
LCT, this has created two distinct sets of market participants ‐ those who have benefits 
from its operation and those who are worse off: 
1. Losers: Special interest industry groups and lobbies who largely base their 
opposition on the price of luxury cars in Australia as compared to other countries 
Refer to Table 3 for an example of this basis for opposition. 
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Table 3: Car price comparison 
 Figures in current AUD (Spinks 2011) 
2. Winners: Those car manufacturers (predominantly from Asia and domestic) as well 
as consumer groups who have a self-interest in non-luxury car affordability, per 
Table 4. Note that the average wage has increased by 63% in the same period (James 
2010). 
 
Table 4: Affordability of Ford Falcon and BMW 320i 
 Ford Falcon affordability BMW 320i affordability 
2006 36 weeks of wages 54 weeks of wages 
2011 31 weeks of wages 43 weeks of wages 
Improvement 
in 
affordability 
16% 26% 
 
 Porsche 911 Rolls Royce 
- Phantom 
Range 
Rover Sport 
V8 
BMW M3 Lexus 
RX450h 
Holden 
Commodor
e SS 
Country of 
origin 
Germany England England Germany Japan Australia 
Australia  $   293,000   $1,068,000   $   160,000   $   168,000   $     97,000   $       45,000  
Japan  $   134,000    $   125,000   $   110,000   $     62,000   
England  $   107,240   $   450,000   $   103,000   $     85,000   $     70,500   
USA  $     77,140   $   373,000   $     72,000   $     59,000   $     46,000   $       30,000  
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The Henry Tax Review (2010) questioned whether the Government, via the LCT, actually 
achieves equity in terms of effective redistribution of income. It also queried the narrow, 
discriminatory nature of the tax, given that the LCT targets consumers who prefer 
expensive cars over most other luxury items.  
  The resulting distortion in the market creates economic inefficiency whereby social 
welfare is prevented from being maximised and creates deadweight loss. However, the 
section of society experiencing this inefficiency is the high-income group of luxury car 
buyers. While this sub-group would be considered relatively small, it is also quite diffuse, 
and therefore difficult to coordinate into a strong enough lobby to effectively oppose the 
LCT. This follows Olsonian Coalition Theory, where a group or coalition must have 
sufficient size and be concentrated (not diffuse), in order to organize successfully and 
become effective.  
  Nevertheless those who are passively (not vocally proactive) in favour of the LCT are also 
aware that it is discriminatory towards the growing minority of people able to purchase a 
luxury car. A 2010 survey on public attitudes to tax demonstrated that better than 80% of 
respondents believe that high income earners pay too little tax (Spinks 2011). Combine this 
sentiment with the comment by Wayne Swann (cited above) and the fact that most other 
luxury goods are not taxed outside of GST and it is clear that the LCT is highly and 
knowingly discriminatory. 
  One key supporting reason for the Government to maintain the LCT is that it has had little 
impact on luxury car sales. The LCT does act as a trade barrier as it taxes a higher 
proportion of imported cars than domestic cars. However, the argument that this has 
limited sales of imported and domestically made luxury cars loses credibility when recent 
luxury car sales as a proportion of total car sales in Australia, has shown substantial 
increases as reported by CommSec (James 2010).  
  Conditioning and cognitive dissonance of the Australian market assist in the acceptance of 
the LCT. Improving affordability has somewhat counteracted the additional cost of the LCT 
as the average income has increased, whereby the gross price of a benchmark vehicle 
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model has remained unchanged. Moreover, the winners from the LCT are more concerned 
about not having to contribute to the $500 million per year that the LCT generates than the 
welfare of those who do. 
 
Conclusion  
The LCT created a deadweight loss as a tax is expected to do. The dynamic effect of 
affordability increasing as the tax rate remains fixed contributed to the situation whereby 
the expected reduction in demand did not happen. The tax is a significant contribution to 
the price of luxury cars, making them appreciably more expensive in Australia than 
countries such as the US, UK and Japan.  However, market demand continues to increase. 
  The LCT was put in place to raise revenue by taxing those deemed to have a higher degree 
of disposable income. While the tax exists against economic theory and expert industry 
advice, this paper corroborates the fact that it adds significant revenue into government 
coffers while reducing the surplus of consumers whom can tolerate it.  
  Based on economic theory and the political economics surrounding the issue, it is clear 
that the LCT is primarily a redistributionary tax that takes from the supposed wealthy few 
and gives to the not-so-wealthy many, albeit in a very inefficient manner. While it is far 
from being the “Robin Hood” of taxes (take from the rich and give to the poor for the 
unambiguous good of society), it is accepted by a largely silent majority of Australians and 
opposed by a noisy few.  
 While the tax does function as a rudimentary revenue raising device its inefficiencies and 
the distortions it creates support a conclusion that it should be removed and replaced with 
a model which takes the recommendations of the Henry Tax Review (2010) into 
consideration. 
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